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1Fuzzy Thinking in Sociology
Lars Winter and Thomas Kron
1.1 Introduction
The well-known distinction between soft and hard science cuts a sharp line of de-
marcation between hard and soft facts of scientific studies. Physics deal with precise
hard facts characteristically whereas social sciences are confronted with imprecise
soft social facts because social facts are notoriously vague, interpretative facts of
meaning. Therefore Fuzzy logic seems to fit perfectly the needs of social scientist
that look for mathematical precise models to deal with vague, imprecise data [52].
In this contribution we discuss the usefulness of Fuzzy logic for social sciences in
general, and especially sociology. In a first step we summarize some fundamentals
of “fuzzy thinking” [10] for social scientist. This will lead to the discussion of the
need of fuzzy thinking in action theory, systems theory, modernization theory and
empirical research. We discuss the advantage of fuzzy thinking for action theory and
social systems theory at length whereas the discussion of fuzzy thinking in modern-
ization theory and empirical research falls short. Modernization theory and empirical
research just function as further examples for the need and usefulness of fuzzy think-
ing.
1.2 “Fuzzy fundamentals” for social scientists
Western scientific community is characterized by a bivalent way of thinking: scien-
tific statements have to be true or false, independent form our ability to find out its
logical value. This way of thinking leads to two fundamentals of Aristotelian logic:
(1) The principle of the excluded contradiction: no statement can be true and false
simultaneously [ x = not(A∩ notA) ]
(2) The principle of the excluded middle (or: principium tertii exclusi): every state-
ments is either true or false [ x = A∪ notA ].
This worldview is also fundamental for a number of sociological theories [27]
but has been an object for reservation; bivalent modelling involves a “problem of
mismatching” [24], p. 19: the social realm is grey but science is black and white.
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Thus, bivalent thinking is not per se adequate to cope with social phenomena. Ac-
cording to Mario Bunge [8], p. 141 it seems that bivalent thinking is as primitive
as the underlying dichotomization is and therefore inconsistent with how the (so-
cial) world is organized. Systems possess polar characteristics but also possess some
characteristics that are not. Polar characteristics are rather exceptions and not the
rule. Therefore we need another way of thinking which is able to cope with world’s
diversity, including polar as well as non-polar characteristics. One candidate for a
(new) way of thinking world’s diversity is Fuzzy logic.
Fuzzy-logic is more than just a method. Fuzzy logic implies a new worldview
[22], [24], [25], [26] that focuses not just on bivalence but also on polyvalence and
therefore challenges the “probabilistic monopoly” of classical Aristotelian logic over
the world [23].1 Polyvalence addresses the fact that systems are fuzzy per se. Fuzzy-
logic “refers to the uncertainty of the system. . . .A Fuzzy set is a collection of objects
without clear boundaries. In a Fuzzy system, there is a transition area where things
can belong to either opposite. . . . A probabilistic statement concerns the uncertainty
among a fixed, unambiguous set of outcomes; a statement of fuzziness concerns
uncertainty in the meaning of the outcomes themselves. The uncertainty in a Fuzzy
set is to a large extent the uncertainty of the system per se” [64], p. 172. One can
imagine easily the progress of fuzzy thinking for how the world is described and
explained.
Fig. 1.1. Fuzzy cube
1 Eastern philosophical thinking challenges classical Aristotelian logics early: “Both Lao-
Tze and the Buddah championed the A-And-not-A view of simultaneous opposites. [. . .]
The Buddha built his whole worldview on first breaking out of the black-white shell of
words that still binds much of Western culture and the modern science is spawned. This
lies at the heart of satori enlightenment in Zen Buddhism [. . .]. [. . .] In any case I cannot
imagine any major Eastern thinker who would claim that P(A∩AC) = 0 holds for all events
A. That is the height of logical and cultural extremism. The probability monopoly is over”
[23], p. 33). German Idealism also challenges bivalent thinking in science [18], [19], [20].
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The progress of fuzzy thinking we have in mind can be demonstrated using the so
called “fuzzy-cube” (or “set-cube”) (Fig. 1.1). It describes the degree of sets referring
to their membership to certain dimensions.2 Thereby Fuzzy sets are not presented as
functions over a basic set but as a single point in a space whose dimensions corre-
spond to the number of elements of the basic set. We can call these elements [x,y]
“fuzzy units” (or “fits”) that designate the degree of membership within a range of
values ( 0,0 and 1,1 ) that is calculated by summing up the fits. The set of all of those
data pairs is a quadrate with a side length of 1, and a point A within this quadrate is
a fuzzy-set A [x,y].
By “mirroring at the central point of the quadrate” one can identify the set notA,
i.e. if A [x,y] then notA [1-x,1-y]. With these two sets one can form the set union
and the intersection of sets. The latter (A-and-notA) is formed by the minimum of
the membership functions:
A∩ A¯= (min(x,x′),min(y,y′)) (1.1)
And the set union of two sets is those set-point that describes the most widely
rectangular extension of both sets:
A∪ A¯= (max(x,x′),max(y,y′)) (1.2)
The set M is the fuzziest set of all sets wherein the known bivalent views loose
their validity because the sets A and notA as well as A-and-notA and A-or-notA are
identical here! This means that the central theorems of bivalent thinking and are not
longer valid.
The subset characteristics of two sets must be “fuzziable” too. The fuzziness of
those sets can be understood as entropy, that is, the degree of uncertainty or disorder
in a system. A set describes a system of elements. If a set is fuzzy – elements belong
to it only partially – this set is vague or indefinite to some degree too. Fuzzy logi-
cal entropy measures the ratio between and , that is, the relation of polyvalence to
bivalence.3
E(A) =
A∩ A¯
A∪ A¯ (1.4)
Fuzzy entropy has some major impact on how we understand and model social
actors’ decision-making.
2 For further discussions see [24].
3 Note that the degree of vagueness of a fuzzy set is defined by the similarity of a set and ist
complement, therefore fuzzy entropy is identical to the degree of subsethood:
Sub(A∪ A¯,A∩ A¯) = ‖ (A∪ A¯,A∩ A¯)‖‖ A∪ A¯‖ =
A∩ A¯
A∪ A¯ (1.3)
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1.3 Action Theory
Actor theoretical approaches have to deal with the analytical problem of the so-called
“definition of situation” [13], [14], p. 29ff, [63], p. 68, that is, how social actors
reflect their selves in a given social situation. To form adequate “bridge hypotheses”
[34] social scientist need a method to link an actor’s “environment” (institutions,
norms, values, communication, symbols etc.) to an actor’s “personal setting” like
internalised norms and values, identities, emotions etc. Fuzzy logic seems to be an
appropriate method to formulate such hypotheses because it enables social scientists
to model the link between situational parameters and the actor’s personal settings
while taking into account that social actors seldom interpret social situations in a
perfect unambiguously way.
We discuss subjective expected utility theory (SEU-theory) (cf. amongst others
[11], [12] to demonstrate that using Fuzzy logic to model the link between an actor’s
environment and an actor’s personal settings leads to a more realistic model of how
social actors define social situations (as real)4 As a consequence Fuzzy logic enables
social scientists to come close to the real process of decision-making in everyday life
situations. According to SEU-theory social actors define their situations by consid-
ering alternatives of action, consequences of action, evaluations and costs. To model
an actor’s expectation (p) social scientists combine the parameters mentioned before.
An expectation is defined, as estimation about what consequence will be realized if
one chooses an action’s alternative under empirically given situational conditions.
Typically social scientists describe the process of how actors build up their expecta-
tions the same way like social actors do, namely by using linguistic terms. Linguistic
terms, that is, vague phrases to describe the world, can be understood and modelled
as fuzzy sets. Linguistic terms form a system of (social) rules to interpret the world.
Thus systems of decision-making consist of if-then-rules that fit for the estimation
of a system function. The more uncertain the rules are the wider are the faces that
cover the function (see for illustration Fig. 1). In other words: expectations are (more
or less) vague if-then-rules. These are e.g. heuristics (“rules of thumb”) of decision-
making that can be modelled with Fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic in this case means de-
ciding with imprecise data and imprecise sets [48], [58]. Thus Fuzzy logic allows to
model complex contexts in which decision-making takes place easily. The technical
expression for this is approximation. We all act in this manner while e.g. driving our
car backwards, catching a ball or watching television. The advantage for sociology
is: while using fuzzy-logic social scientists can simulate this dynamical “everyday
approximation” in decision-making realistically and in an easy way without being
forced to fall back on simplifying as-if-assumptions. Take for example the so-called
bystander dilemma [9], [33], [31], [32], [51], [60]. The problem we face is why do
actors in situations where their help is needed, e.g. a situation where one is attacked,
act or just stand on the sidelines or even look the other way. How do actors take a
stance on the situation? We take the example of the so-called emotional man [15]
[59], p. 107ff as a typical social actor in such a situation. We hypothize, that the feel-
4 “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” [62], p. 572.
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ing of endangerment has an impact on emotional man’s decision. We state that there
exist four alternative actions: (1) Helping, (2) Signalling his will to help, (3) Ignoring
or (4) Leaving the situation. The consequences of action could be “feeling of safety”
or “feeling of endangerment”. For the sake of the argument we state that there exist
two relevant situational parameters that influences the actors decision, namely the
number of other actors who will help and the power of the person who attacks. We
assume that the feeling of endangerment is reduced when the number of people who
help the victim increases. The feeling of safety increases (or sinks) in accordance to
the attacker’s strength. An emotional man has to decide whether he is going to help,
signalling his will to help, ignore or even leave the situation according to his estima-
tion of how many people help and on his estimation about the attacker’s strength. It
is striking here that such estimations are fuzzy.5
Fig. 1.2. Number of people
In a first step we define the relevant fuzzy sets and their value range to model
these estimations (Fig.1.2, 1.3) as input variables of our fuzzy-decision-system. The
output-variable “feeling of endangerment” is “fuzzified” as well (Fig.1.4).
5 Even the estimation about how many people are helping right now or will help could be
fuzzy not at least because exceptional circumstances do not allow “rational” precise evalu-
ations of every relevant parameter.
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Fig. 1.3. Attacker’s strength
Fig. 1.4. Feeling of endangerment
Nowwe have to define bridge hypotheses to link the input-variables to the output-
variable with the help of simple if-then-rules. In our example we need twelve rules
to respect all relevant relations between the variables:
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Table 1.1. If-then-rules
Number of Attecker’s Feeling of
people Strength endangerment
1 none low relatively low
2 none middle relatively high
3 none high high
4 few low relatively low
5 few middle middle
6 few high relatively high
7 some low relatively low
8 some middle middle
9 some high relatively high
10 many low low
11 many middle relatively low
12 many high relatively high
Fig. 1.5. Output “Feeling of endangerment”
For illustration we assume that an actor (emotional man) estimates that 15 other
actors will help and that the attacker’s strength seems to be quite high. As a result
three fuzzy-output-sets (feeling of endangerment) are activated partially (Fig.1.5):
relatively low feeling of endangerment is activated to the degree of 0.12, feeling of
endangerment middle is activated to the degree of 0.29 and the Fuzzy set relatively
high feeling of endangerment is activated to the degree of 0.43). In the end this leads
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to a feeling of endangerment of 58.316, that is, “our” actor expects (p) that he will
realize a feeling of endangerment of about 58% if he engages in this situation.
To put it otherwise: all rules exert an effect parallel but only partially. This means
that using fuzzy-logic enables social scientists to model overlaps of diverse vague
and possible contradictorily expectations too. The result is a fuzzy-weighted average
of different expectations. This output value can be displayed in a three-dimensional
space (Fig. 1.6).
Fig. 1.6. Non-linear relations
It can be seen that such a fuzzy-system allows modelling even non-linear re-
lations easily because every curve can be covered by fuzzy-faces. The broader the
faces the less we know about the details of the problem of decision-making. More
precision leads to smaller faces but with the consequence that we need more faces
(= more information) to cover the curve. In boundary cases the face shrinks towards
zero, i.e. we have a natural number and no fuzzy set anymore. But it is difficult to
work with small triangles because they do not just loose their fuzziness but also loose
their sociological meaning. Precision has its price. It is hard to produce the necessary
precision for an explanation but it is eased inasmuch as fuzzy-logic is conformable
with different methods of producing bridge hypotheses. And we are able to adjust
the faces in such a way that fuzzy systems can model dynamical systems. Moreover
Fuzzy logic advantages actor theory by considering an admeasurement of vagueness
(ambiguity) in form of fuzzy entropy.7 The ambiguity of an expectation as a Fuzzy
6 We use the method of centre of gravity to calculate the output-value.
7 Note that classical action theory focuses on risky decisions, uncertain decision and safe
decisions although it is obvious that actors (most of the time) do not possess non-ambiguous
expectations [14], p. 54ff. An actor is absolute uncertain if he is not able to possess any
expectation value (p= 0). An actor is absolute certain if he possesses p= 1. Risky decision
takes place if an actor possesses an expectation p between the range of 0 and 1. Ambiguity
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set is its entropy, its expectation vagueness [27]. Within the framework of SEU the-
ory we can now formalise the expected-utility-weight (EU) in respect of the actor’s
ambiguity of expectations: when an expectation p (as a fuzzy set) of an action alter-
native A has been calculated then it is possible to ascertain its complement as well as
the union set and the intersection and therewith calculate the expectation vagueness
EV(A). This admeasurement of vagueness can be considered in the calculation rule
of expected-utility-weights:
EUi =∑(pi− (EVi · pi)) ·Ui (1.5)
If fuzzy entropy is equal 1 (total ambiguity) the actor is totally vague about his
or her expectation whatever his/her expectation is based on. The expected-utility-
weights are zero. Only if the actor is absolute certain about its expectation (no am-
biguity) the common view of SEU theory applies. All values in-between the range
of 0 and 1 reduce the expected-utility-weight of the action alternative accordingly.
It is possible to derive the expectation vagueness EV from the output-fuzzy-set and
to enter it into the formula for utility-expectation-weights of the single alternatives
of action. For that purpose we assume that the wider the faces that represent expec-
tations as Fuzzy sets the higher the vagueness of expectation. And: the higher the
degree of membership the more this vagueness applies (the more this vagueness is
imposed). Thus the expectation vagueness EV can be calculated using the following
formula:
Expectation VaguenessEV = f ace ·
√
basiclength (1.6)
In the example given above this would lead to an expectation vagueness of about
22,6%:
EU(Helping) = (0.58 · (1−0.226)) ·UHelping = 0.44892 ·UHelping (1.7)
In this case expectation vagueness leads to a reduction of the original expectation
p about 13% because of the actor’s ambiguity in respect of the parameters “attacker’s
strength" and “number of people who help".
To sum up: Fuzzy logic enables sociologist to formulate bridge hypotheses to
model the definition of situation in an easy and realistic way. One major advantage
of using Fuzzy logic is that Fuzzy logic refers to differences in kind (i.e. qualita-
tive dimension) as well as to differences in degree of membership (i.e. quantitative
dimension) at the same time. The derivation of bridge hypothesis with the help of
Fuzzy logic gives social scientists one method at hand to specify the logic of social
situations and to describe the parameter for the logic of action-selection in one step.
Bridge hypotheses are formulated as if-then-statements. Thus they do not only re-
fer to the estimation of consequences of action but also consider the environmental
parameters actors attach importance too. Fuzzy logic is a very useful tool to model
instead means that an actor is even uncertain about his expectations, that is, he is fuzzy in
his expectations.
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the relations between situational parameters and actors’ orientations because social,
symbolized relational patterns are not ascertainable by the interpretation of detailed
situational information (crisp set of information), but only few information (fuzzy
set of information) are sufficient to recognize and define the social situation. In ad-
dition: the fact, that social actors combine situational parameters to a certain pattern
that represents the definition of the situation not in every detail but on the basis of
more or less vague representations, leads to the idea of “vague pattern matching” that
goes beyond detailed reflection of single framing-processes.8
1.4 Considering fuzziness in the study of social systems
Although Niklas Luhmann [43], p. 904ff has criticized bivalent thinking in classical
Aristotelian logics it is obvious that his conception of social systems idealizes biva-
lence on the operational level of social systems [27], [30].9 Surprisingly, only few
have yet recognized or even scrutinized the two-valued operational logic of social
systems [7], [45], [46], [47]. The two-valued operational logic of social systems is
founded in the central distinction between system and environment, which is as Luh-
mann [38], p. 94 stated inherently problematic because the distinction itself has to
be distinguished in a first step. According to George Spencer-Brown [61] observers
have to draw a distinction; every observation has to distinguish and designate, that is,
distinguishes two sides of the form and designates one side for further observations.
The observer functions as the tertium non datur which cannot be observed simulta-
neously while observation takes place [43], p. 62, 69). Therefore observation has to
blind out (have to make invisible) the fundamental paradox that every observation as
a form has a different form as a prerequisite, which cannot be distinguished but via a
new form of observation. To put it straightforward: if two sides of the form are dis-
tinguished one cannot observe the difference without designating one side because
otherwise the different values would be observed as equal values [38], p. 80, [39],
p. 201. Therefore three modes exist to cope with the paradox of observation [39], p.
201f: factually, if one observes he has to follow the imperative "draw a distinction";
temporarily, if one observes he has to proceed consecutively, that is, observation al-
ways affiliates on one side of the distinction but can change the sides in time; socially,
one can observe what others observe while reflecting different forms of observation
- this is the idea of second order observation. The latter leads over to a critical reflec-
tion of Aristotelian bivalent logic. In accordance with Gotthard Günther [18], [19],
[20] Luhmann agues that Aristotelian bivalent logic reflects the ontological differ-
ence between being and non-being which leads to the idea of the excluded middle:
boundaries, caesurae, everything in-between belongs to the non-being, to the realm
8 Thus frame analysis [16] is a branch of fuzzy pattern thinking for social actors as well as
for social scientist.
9 This is getting obvious in the following citation: “A woman may be pregnant or not: she
cannot be a little pregnant. This is true of course for ’system maintenance’ as well” [36] ,
p. 183.
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of the ontologically excluded middle [43], p. 905. In a constructivist fashion Luh-
mann [40], [44] denies the ability to achieve knowledge about how the world really
is: we have to abstain form the very idea that we could achieve knowledge of an
unobservable and unobserved world, therefore we have to take into account the ob-
server and ask for how does an observer construe identities [43], p. 767. The answer
is straightforward: identities come into being while systems operate autopoetically
and generate the elements that they need to sustain identity. For that background so-
cial systems could be best understood as a recursive network of observations. Or, to
put it slightly different: social systems are themselves observers. While observing,
that is, affiliating observations to observations, social systems generate eigenvalues
that allow specifying which elements belong to the system and allow manifesting the
identity of the system in difference to the system’s environment [43], p. 60ff. In that
sense binary coding functions as a contrast or crispy set [36], p. 91 that assign what
belongs to one or the other value [37], p. 76f, [42]. Because binary coding could be
easily institutionalized and practically handled, not at least because binary coding
reduces complexity rapidly, they enable the system to operate unambiguously in an
enormous complex environment [41], p. 177f. To conclude: although Luhmann crit-
icizes classical Aristotelian bivalent logic because it lacks a reference to the tertium
non datur of observation, that is: the observer, he does not criticizes bivalence per se.
Contrariwise bivalence is the fundamental operational principle of social systems.
And this is, as [43], p. 1113 stated, neither a criticism nor a factual statement but just
a confession: to observe means to distinguish and to designate otherwise observation
could not be possible. But what if the fundamental operations of the social do not fol-
low any bivalent principle? Following Niklas Luhmann [35], [43] the fundamental
operations of social systems are communications. Communication is defined as the
synthesis of three selections: information, message and understanding [35], p. 92ff.
Without going into depth this needs some clarifying remarks. Communication is not
understood as an intentional act. Communication therefore has not to be taken as a
way of transporting information form on system to another system. Instead, com-
munication has to be analyzed “the other way around”, that is, communication has
taken place when understanding takes place. Understanding distinguishes informa-
tion and message as distinct selections. Therefore communication permanently os-
cillates between information (as information) and message (as information), that is,
understanding distinguishes information and message and designates on side of the
form for subsequent communications. Imagine for example a bouquet of red roses as
a form of communication. Despite what a (fictional) husband has in mind when he is
going to present the bouquet of red roses to his wife it is possible that his wife does
not understand the gift as a love symbol but as a sign that something (maybe a liaison)
gnaws at her husband’s conscience. In this case the message becomes informative.
One can easily imagine how the communication will proceed in that case. The argu-
ment here is that communication is inherently ambivalent because it is in principle
possible to take the message as information [1], p. 54ff. But, despite the permanent
ambivalent character of communication, what if information and message become
liquid in the sense, that the difference is amenable for several interpretations, that is,
communication is ambiguous. Colin B. Grant [17] asks in that case for a revision of
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the communicational components of Luhmann’s systems theory. Grant argues that
one has always to consider that communication is supplied with contingencies and
uncertainties. As Hempel [21], p. 170 states: “the terms of our language in scientific
as well as in everyday use, are not completely precise, but exhibit a more or less high
degree of vagueness.” If communication is inherently vague, this also will be the case
of systems that rely on communication. “Thus it follows that systems . . . are porous
in their communication” [17], p. 224). Luhmann instead overemphasis the stability
of social systems and neglected the vagueness of communication. Although there are
reasons to assume that in some cases binary coded schemes to orientate communi-
cation really exist, “it can also be said that binary codes . . . and schematisms are in
themselves porous” [17], p. 225f. This leads to the conclusion that “if communica-
tion is uncertain, this resolution is permanently polysemic” [17], p. 226. Therefore
one has to consider fuzziness in the study of social systems; as already mentioned,
non-ambiguous communication is possible but could be taken as an exception that
proves the rule. Two kinds of vagueness have to be considered in the analysis of fuzzy
systems. First, one has to consider the vagueness concerning the binary coding of so-
cial systems, that is, not every communicational event can be assigned to one value of
the code unambiguously - this kind of vagueness should be termed vagueness of cod-
ing. Second, and as a result of the first vagueness, not every communicational event
belongs to a system clearly but could cross the system-environment-boundary and
therefore could belong to different systems simultaneously – this kind of vagueness
is termed: vagueness of affiliation.
1.4.1 Vagueness of coding
Vagueness of coding addresses the fact that communications sometimes cannot be
located in a binary coded scheme unambiguously. For example, it seems to be an
idealized assumption that the code of the legal system (legal/illegal) [41] always en-
ables an observer to decide what is right or wrong. Using Fuzzy logic as a modelling
tool the distinction between legal and illegal can be best understood as crisp sets of
the legal system designating two points of a continuous spectrum that “measures”
what kind of communication could count as legal or illegal in degree. This contin-
uous spectrum of “legal and illegal communications” consists of several values in
between the two crisp sets of legal or illegal communications. This could be called
the systemic set-triangular of vague coding.
A communicational event that is located in between the two crisp sets can be
called fuzzy unit or fit. Those fuzzy units can be interpreted as the degree a com-
munication belonging to the crisp set values of legal and illegal communication and
can be measured easily by summing up the fits. The centre of the continuous straight
line connecting the crisp sets of legal and illegal communication can then be inter-
preted as the most fuzziness form of communication that is legal as well as illegal.
To calculate the measure of fuzziness we use the idea of fuzzy entropy (Fig.1.8).
If a set is fuzzy, that is, elements do belong to this set partially, the set is fuzzy to
some degree. Fuzzy entropy is calculated as the quotient of the distances d between
a communicational event A located on s and the crisp sets (1,0 , 0,1) in percentage.
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Fig. 1.7. Systemic set-triangular of vague coding
Fig. 1.8. Entropy of Coding
The more a communicational event belongs to one of the crisp sets the less vague
it is:
Vagueness of coding :
dA → [1,0]
dA → [0,1] (1.8)
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The highest degree of vagueness can be measured if a communicational event is
located in the centre of s: EntropyA =
0.5
0.5
= 1
One can now imagine easily what would be the case if communication becomes
fuzzy: social systems cannot longer place communication unambiguously and thus
are not longer able to reproduce the clear distinction between the two values of the
code. The code itself becomes vague and at least the distinction between system
and environment is becoming porous. But this does not mean necessarily that binary
coded schemes will erode completely. Binary coding still functions as a horizon that
orientates communication: the systems code is still in place while the idea of bivalent
operational logic is dismissed.
1.4.2 Vagueness of affiliation
Taking into account that communications can cross the system-environment-distinction,
not at least because the code itself can erode in cases where communication cannot
longer be located unambiguously, it is striking here that one has to consider commu-
nicational events that could belong to the system as well as to the system’s environ-
ment. If communication is vague system-environment-distinction will be vague too.
A communication that belongs to a system’s environment unambiguously is consid-
ered to be an element of a blank set. That means a communication that does not
belong to a system is defined negatively through exclusion 0/0 .
On the contrary, a communication belonging to a system is defined through the
degree of affiliation. Taking into account that a communicational event does not nec-
essarily belong to the values of the code but could vary in the degree of affiliation,
it follows that this communication is not a clearly defined element of the system. As
pictured in Fig. 1.9 a communicational event A just belongs to the system gradually.
This could be interpreted as vagueness of affiliation. The vagueness of affiliation
could also be calculated as fuzzy entropy but now measured as the quotient of the
distance between A to s and the distance of A to the blank set [0,0].
Vagueness of affiliation : A=
dA → s
dA → [0,0] (1.9)
It is now getting obvious that the vagueness of affiliation necessarily implies
vagueness of coding because every time the degree of affiliation becomes fuzzy it is
not clear how the communication can be placed relative to the code values, that is,
communication belongs to both value sets of the code to some degree. This leads over
to the idea of system’s interpenetration. According to [49], p. 14 – and in contrast
to [35], p. 286ff – interpenetration addresses the fact that elements could belong
to different systems simultaneously. Thus it is untenable to state that elements are
either elements of one or another system. Taking vagueness of affiliation seriously it
is striking here that communications could belong to one system as well as to another
system partially (Fig.1.10).10
10 Surprisingly even Luhmann [43], p. 775 assumes that under the conditions of functional
differentiation a multiplicity of communication exists which cannot be located exclusively
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Fig. 1.9. Vagueness of affiliation (System’s Entropy)
Fig. 1.10. Systems interpenetration
belonging to one system. This is a characteristic of modern society. But instead taking
vagueness of affiliation seriously Luhmann argues that vagueness is reduced in time.
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Fuzzy logic allows overcoming bivalent thinking in systems theory. Instead of
overemphasizing bivalence as a criterion of social systems’ stability, fuzzy thinking
forces social scientists to have an eye for vague, imprecise communicational pro-
cesses within social systems and thus sensitize an observer for (social) mechanisms
that allow dealing with social fuzziness. Actual Ulrich Beck is one prominent soci-
ologist who emphasizes fuzzy thinking in modernization theory.
1.5 Fuzzy Thinking in Modernization theory
The so-called Theory of Reflexive Modernity by Ulrich Beck [4] emphasizes the
need to think in terms of as well as instead of either-or. Straightforwardly speaking,
Beck claims - in order to analyze second modernity – for the need of fuzzy thinking
in social sciences. The idea of second modernity addresses the fact that institutional
settings of first modernity are not longer adequate to deal with the unintended con-
sequences generated by industrial societies and their undamped growth [2]. Second
modernity is characterized by social phenomena that do not longer fit in well-defined
categories with sharp boundaries. Contrariwise social phenomena of second moder-
nity possess characteristics that correspond to the “new" worldview of Fuzzy logics,
namely, that social phenomenon sometimes possess polar characteristics but most of
the time do not. Therefore Ulrich Beck [3] claims for a new method of theorizing
modern society - methodological cosmopolitism. Methodological nationalism on the
contrary perfectly fits in the old institutional setting of first modernity but is nowa-
days nothing more than anachronistic way of thinking; the logic of methodological
nationalism is bivalent in the sense that the categories are well defined and clear-cut,
thus methodological nationalism is characterized by dualistic and antagonistic con-
cepts like friend vs. enemy, us vs. them, for us vs. against us. This way of thinking
in terms of black and white (good and evil) will fail in the light of second moder-
nity.11 Thus methodological cosmopolitism takes social fuzziness seriously like in
the case of transnational terrorism. The war on terrorism for example fits the needs
of traditional institutional settings but is inadequate to deal with new forms of terror-
ism not at least because there is no country on which war could be declared. Several
other dualistic and antagonistic concepts fall short for characterising transnational
terrorism as well: e.g., Al-Qaida’s ideology is modern and anti-modern, Al-Qaida
operates local and global and not at least Al-Qaida is afar and close to its enemies
[28]. In short: adequate theorizing of social phenomena needs fuzzy thinking and at
least Fuzzy logic as an appropriate tool to model social phenomena.12 This applies
to social research methodologies too.
11 For example [3] states that war is peace.
12 It is obvious that the idea and model of fuzzy systems is a first step in the right direction.
If well-defined and clear-cut social categories do not longer fit the “empirical world” we
need a way to think, theorize and model how social systems and social agents proceed in a
fuzzy environment.
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1.6 Fuzziness in social research
The surplus of Fuzzy logic for the social research was early recognized by Charles
Ragin [54], [55], [56], [50]. Charles Ragin advanced traditional Qualitative Compar-
ative Analysis [53], [5], [6] in macro-sociological studies using fuzzy-logical oper-
ations to include diversity of kind and diversity of membership degree in configura-
tional analysis of social causal factors. Qualitative Comparative Analysis, generally
speaking, aims at identifying necessary and/or sufficient (configurations of) causal
factors for a social outcome13. Those prime implicants, as Ragin calls them, are com-
mon (configurations of) causal factors of a certain group of social cases in regard to
a certain social outcome. Prime implicants “explain” how social causes combine to
generate a specific social effect. Cases are understood as configurations of variables.
Those variables are interpreted as factors that lead to an outcome. The comparison
of cases as configuration of factors in regard of an specific outcome (diversity of
kind) and their fuzzy membership to those configurational sets of factors (diversity
of degree) results in parsimonious explanations that deal with as much complexity
as required by sociology but at the same time are simple enough to explain the social
effect sufficiently [57]. Because social diversity is complex, comparative analysis of-
ten results in different causal paths that generate the same social effect. For classical
research strategies (especially quantitative social research) this might seem to be a
disadvantage as long as science is looking for causal laws of hard facts. But, as we
already stated in the beginning, the realm of the social is not governed by hard facts,
therefore there is a need for a method that allows considering diversity and complex-
ity without given up the idea that diverse, complex cases could be explained even
if they are fuzzy. To conclude: Formal logic and linguistic formulations converge
in Fuzzy logic. The specification of variables and degrees of membership is theo-
retically and empirically instructed. Thus Fuzzy Set Social Sciences [54] provides
an interpretative tool that forces social scientist to bring together theory, empirical
evidence and formal logic in one research strategy while considering diversity and
complexity of the social realm.
1.7 Conclusion
We gave a brief outline of the usefulness of Fuzzy logic for different branches of
sociology. We focused on action theory and social systems theory as two impor-
tant candidates for fuzzy thinking. The advantages are at hand: Fuzzy logic closes
the gab between real-life decision-making in everyday life and traditional models
of decision-making (e.g. SEU theory) while taking seriously that a social actor sel-
dom calculates his actions on the basis of precise, sharp, unambiguous expectation.
Contrariwise social actors decide on the basis of vague representations of social sit-
uations and on basis of vague expectations. Fuzzy thinking in social systems the-
ory considers imprecise and vague communications as well as vague distinctions or
13 John Stuart Mill speaks of chemical causation.
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rather imprecise differences. This leads to the idea of fuzzy systems characterized by
vague system-environment distinctions, vague code-differences and vague commu-
nicational tokens. The social realm is inherently vague, therefore there is a need for
fuzzy thinking. Especially modernization theory could benefit from fuzzy thinking
in the long run. Nowadays it seems already unimaginable to do macro-sociological
comparative research without Fuzzy logic.
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